Union of India & Ors. v. K Sub Maj (Hony Capt) Mohanraj T.K.
W.P.(C) No. 19501 of 2026 | Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:52646
Decided on 16 July 2026 | Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Natarajan & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Johnson John
I. Prefatory Remarks
Few controversies in Indian service jurisprudence have proved as perennial (recurring year after year) as the denial of the disability element of pension to soldiers afflicted with Type-II Diabetes Mellitus and Primary Hypertension. The Release Medical Board, with almost formulaic (mechanically repetitive) regularity, records a laconic (terse, using very few words) endorsement, “lifestyle disease” -and the claim is extinguished at the threshold.
On 16 July 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam dismissed the Union of India’s writ petition and, in doing so, delivered an observation destined to be quoted for years: a soldier is a blank cheque written to the country for any amount up to and including his life.
The judgment is a salutary (wholesome, remedial) reaffirmation of a principle that Indian courts have articulated repeatedly but which the executive continues to honour in the breach, the burden of proving non-entitlement rests upon the employer, never upon the veteran. In the language of the classical maxim, onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat — the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts, not upon him who denies.
II. Factual Matrix
The respondent, a Kerala-domiciled Subedar Major (Honorary Captain) of the Madras Engineer Group, was invalided out of service. His Release Medical Board recorded seven disabilities, of which the two germane (directly relevant) to the litigation were
|Disability |Attributable to Service|Aggravated by Service|Justification recorded by the Board |
|———————————-|———————–|———————|—————————————————————————–|
|Type-II Diabetes Mellitus (E 11.9)|No |No |Denied on ground of “lifestyle modification” — Para 26, Ch. VI, GMO (MP) 2008|
|Primary Hypertension (I 10.0) |No |No |Denied on ground of “lifestyle modification” — Para 43, Ch. VI, GMO (MP) 2008|
The remaining entries, a CVA embolic infarct of the right temporal lobe, Grade I spondylolisthesis of L5 over S1, fracture of the right sacral ala, acute left shoulder dislocation and pubic diastasis, were negatived by reference to an Injury Report (IAFY-2006) and a Court of Inquiry.
Aggrieved, the officer approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi in O.A. No. 1 of 2023. By order dated 12 January 2024, the Tribunal directed the authorities to:
1. Obtain, from a competent Medical Board, the composite degree of disability of Type-II Diabetes Mellitus (assessed at 20%) and Primary Hypertension (assessed at 30%), within three months;
2. Issue a Corrigendum PPO granting the disability element of pension from the date of discharge;
3. Disburse arrears within six months, failing which the unpaid amounts would carry interest at 9% per annum.
The Union of India assailed that order under Article 226 of the Constitution before Kerala High Court.
III. The Rival Contentions
For the petitioners (Union of India), the learned Senior Panel Counsel urged that the Tribunal was not justified in recording a finding contrary to the opinion of the Medical Board, that opinion being that the disabilities were neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service.
For the respondent (the veteran), reliance was placed upon the trinity of Supreme Court authorities in Sukhvinder Singh v. Union of India [(2014) 14 SCC 364], Bijender Singh v. Union of India [2025 SCC OnLine SC 895] and Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India [(2013) 7 SCC 316] to contend that a member is presumed to be in sound physical and mental condition upon entering service if no note or record exists at the time of entrance; that any subsequent deterioration culminating in discharge on medical grounds is presumed to be due to service; and that the onus probandi of non-entitlement lies squarely with the employer.
IV. The Statutory Architecture: Regulation 423, RMSAF 1983
The Tribunal’s order rested upon Regulation 423 of the Regulations for Medical Services of the Armed Forces, 1983, which stipulates inter alia that a disease which has led to an individual’s discharge or death shall ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service if no note of it was made at the time of acceptance for service. The lone exception is where medical opinion holds for reasons to be stated that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance.
The words “for reasons to be stated” are not decorative. They are the fulcrum (the pivot on which the whole matter turns) of the entire entitlement architecture. A conclusion unsupported by reasons is an ipse dixit a bare assertion resting on nothing but the speaker’s own say-so and the law has never accorded such assertions the dignity of evidence.
V. The Precedential Edifice
(a) Dharamvir Singh (2013) 7 SCC 316 the locus classicus
Paragraph 29 of Dharamvir Singh remains the locus classicus. The Kerala High Court reproduced its seven-fold distillation, of which the following are decisive of the issue
• 29.1 — Disability pension is payable where the disability is attributable to or aggravated by military service in a non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20% or over.
• 29.2 — A member is presumed sound on entry absent any note at entrance; subsequent deterioration leading to discharge on medical grounds is presumed due to service [Rule 5 read with Rule 14(b)].
• 29.3 — The onus is not on the claimant; the onus of establishing non-entitlement is on the employer. The claimant has a right to the benefit of any reasonable doubt and to a liberal construction of pensionary benefit (Rule 9).
• 29.5 — Where no note of disability was made at acceptance, a disease leading to discharge is deemed to have arisen in service [Rule 14(b)].
• 29.6 — If medical opinion holds that the disease could not have been detected prior to acceptance, the Board must state reasons.
• 29.7 — It is mandatory for the Medical Board to follow Chapter II of the Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pensions), 2002, “Entitlement: General Principles”.
(b) Sukhvinder Singh (2014) 14 SCC 364 — the five-fold persuasion
The Court extracted paragraph 11, wherein the Supreme Court reasoned that any disability not recorded at recruitment must be presumed to have been caused subsequently and, unless proved to the contrary, to be a consequence of military service. Any other conclusion, the Court observed, would amount to granting a premium to the Recruitment Medical Board for its own negligence a proposition that resonates with the venerable maxim that no one may take advantage of his own wrong.
The Court further reasoned that the morale of the armed forces requires absolute and undiluted protection; that no provision authorises invaliding out where disability is below twenty per cent; that where a member is invalided out it must perforce be assumed the disability exceeded twenty per cent; and that a disability leading to invaliding attracts fifty per cent disability pension.
(c) Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064] — the death-knell of the “lifestyle” defence
Two propositions from Rajumon T.M. proved decisive:
1. Where the opinion of the Medical Board is devoid of reasons, the act of the authority founded upon mere opinion sans reasons can certainly be questioned.
2. The mere fact that, at the onset of the disease, service was being rendered at a peace location, or that the disease is characterised as a lifestyle disorder, is not by itself a sufficient reason to deny attributability to military service.
(d) Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya (2022) 16 SCC 343, beneficial construction
Social security legislation must be construed liberally and given the widest meaning the language permits. Where a word is capable of two meanings one preserving the benefit and one defeating it, the former must be adopted. This is the doctrine of beneficial interpretation, encapsulated that constructions are to be made benignly, in favour of the beneficiary.
(e) Union of India v. Parashotam Dass [(2025) 5 SCC 786] the ambit of Article 226
The High Court reiterated that where there is denial of a fundamental right, a jurisdictional error, or an error apparent on the face of the record, the High Court may interfere under Article 226; and a distinction of considerable forensic value that self-restraint in the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction is conceptually distinct from an embargo (a prohibition) upon its exercise.
VI. The Ratio Decidendi
The Court’s reasoning may be compressed into four propositions:
First, it was undisputed that no note of any disease had been recorded when the respondent enrolled. In the absence of medical opinion or records indicating that the disease could not have been detected at entry, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumptions, particularly sub-clause (c) of Regulation 423.
Second, the “detailed justification” offered by the Release Medical Board for columns 1 and 2 amounted to nothing more than the assertion that the conditions were lifestyle diseases. Following Rajumon T.M., such an assertion is not a reason at all, it is a conclusion masquerading (disguising itself) as one.
Third, and most memorably, the Bench located the question within a constitutional and moral frame:
It is a core responsibility of the Government and society to protect the morale of the soldiers, as soldiers are the ones who risk their lives for the country. A soldier is a blank cheque written to the country for any amount up to and including his life.
The Court invoked Article 33 of the Constitution, which permits Parliament to restrict or abrogate (abolish) the fundamental rights of members of the armed forces to ensure proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline. Where a citizen’s rights are thus curtailed in the national interest, it is a non sequitur to then deny him pensionary succour on so slender a ground as “lifestyle”.
Fourth, on the scope of certiorari, the Court held that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 may be invoked only to prevent manifest injustice and cannot be deployed to correct every error or mistake in a Tribunal’s order. Finding neither illegality nor jurisdictional error, the Bench declined to disturb the Tribunal’s finding and granted disability pension benefits.
Held: The respondent is entitled to the disability element of pension for his invaliding diseases, Type-II Diabetes Mellitus and Primary Hypertension with composite disability to be assessed by a competent Medical Board. The writ petition was dismissed.
VII. Practical Implications for Veterans and Practitioners
1. Interrogate the Board’s “Detailed Justification” column. A citation to Para 26 or Para 43 of Chapter VI of the GMO (MP) 2008, without individualised reasoning referable to the claimant’s service profile, is vulnerable. Rajumon T.M. and Dharamvir Singh (para 29.6) together render such endorsements otiose (serving no useful purpose).
2. Secure and plead the Attestation/Enrolment Medical Examination record. The absence of a note at entry is the linchpin (the element holding everything together) of the statutory presumption. It must be pleaded expressly, not left to inference.
3. Plead composite assessment. Where two or more disabilities individually cross or approach the threshold, the composite degree under the applicable rules may materially enhance the award as it did here (20% + 30%).
4. Anticipate the writ. Parashotam Dass is now the standard artillery deployed by the Union in resisting and in mounting writ challenges to AFT orders. Practitioners should be prepared to distinguish between self-restraint and embargo, and to demonstrate the absence of jurisdictional error.
5. Do not concede the “peace station” argument. The proposition that service at a peace location dilutes attributability has been decisively repudiated (rejected as unfounded).
VIII. Concluding Observations
The judgment is, in substance, a judicial refusal to permit administrative shorthand to defeat a statutory entitlement. The stress, dietary irregularity, sleep deprivation, frequent dislocation and psychological burden that attend military service are not incidental to it; they are constitutive of it. To brand the sequelae (the conditions consequent upon) of such service as “lifestyle” choices is, with respect, to invert cause and effect.
Fiat justitia ruat caelum — let justice be done though the heavens fall. In the domain of military pensions, the heavens have never fallen; only the pleadings of the State have.
The author is an advocate practising before the Armed Forces Tribunal (Principal Bench), the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court of India, specialising in military and service law.
Source reporting: LiveLaw